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Abstract: According to some prominent accounts of scientific progress, 
e.g. Bird’s epistemic account, accepting new theories is progressive only if 
the theories are justified in the sense required for knowledge. This paper 
argues that epistemic justification requirements of this sort should be 
rejected because they misclassify many paradigmatic instances of 
scientific progress as non-progressive. In particular, scientific progress 
would be implausibly rare in cases where (a) scientists are aware that 
most or all previous theories in some domain have turned out to be false, 
or (b) the new theory was a result of subsuming and/or logically 
strengthening previous theories, or (c) scientists are aware of significant 
peer disagreement about which theory is correct. 
 
1. Introduction 
Most would agree that science is one of – if not the – human endeavor in which we’ve 
made the most progress in the past few centuries. But what makes us so sure that the 
various changes that have occurred in science are genuinely progressive? What is 
required for scientific progress? 
 Philosophical accounts of scientific progress contain different answers to this 
question. These accounts purport to tell us both what is, and what isn’t, required for 
scientific progress. In this paper, I will be concerned with a particular requirement 
that is implied by some such account and not others. Roughly, this requirement holds 
that the acceptance of a new theory counts as progressive only if the theory is 
epistemically justified. Such a requirement is explicitly and enthusiastically endorsed 
by some in the debate about scientific progress (e.g. Bird 2007, Park, 2018, Needham 
2020). Others have rejected such a justification requirement as unnecessary or 
unmotivated (e.g. Rowbottom 2008, Niiniluoto 2014, Cevolani and Tambolo 2013, 
Dellsén 2016). 
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 This paper argues in favor of the latter position. My arguments will not rely 
heavily on our pre-theoretic intuitions about whether we would be inclined to use the 
term ‘progress’ to describe some hypothetical episode in science. Rather, I’ll attempt 
to identify a wide range of paradigmatic cases of scientific progress in which epistemic 
justification is lacking. Denying progress in these cases would not just be 
counterintuitive, but also go against various truisms about scientific methodology and 
imply that there is much less progress in science than most of us have previously 
thought. Thus, in brief, I hope to be moving beyond clashing intuitions about 
hypothetical cases, and instead provide a different type of argument against the 
justification requirement on scientific progress. 
 
2. Scientific Progress and Epistemic Justification 
What are accounts of scientific progress accounts of? What is the question to which an 
account of scientific progress is supposed to be the answer? In what follows I take the 
central question of scientific progress to be this: 
What type of cognitive change with respect to a given phenomenon X 
constitutes a (greater or lesser degree of) scientific improvement with respect 
to X? 
For reasons of space, I will not defend my focus on this question here. I will, however, 
clarify three key phrases therein. 
The first clarification concerns the phrase ‘type of cognitive change’. This is 
meant to cover, inter alia, the process of adopting a new theory about some previously 
untheorized phenomenon, and the process of replacing one theory with another.1 
Different accounts of scientific progress will disagree on exactly what types of 
adoption/replacement are required for scientific progress, e.g. whether the adoption 
of a new theory requires coming to know the contents of the new theory. Here and in 
what follows, the term ‘theory’ should be interpreted very broadly, so as to count any 
type of scientific representation – including hypotheses, models, and natural laws – as 
‘theories’. 
 
1 It is also meant to cover other types of cognitive changes, such as discarding a (mistaken) theory, 
discovering a new phenomenon, and developing a new explanation for a familiar phenomenon using 
an extant theory. But for current purposes we can set such cases aside and focus on cases of 
adopting/replacing theories. 
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A second clarification concerns the term ‘constitutes’. It is a truism that there 
are many ways for science to progress – even cognitively, i.e. with respect to its 
theories (representations). For example, there is surely a sense in which scientists 
make progress as they collect more evidence or develop new formalisms. These are 
all forms of progress… in a sense. But I say that we should distinguish these from the 
type of progress that occurred, for example, when J.J. Thomson’s plum pudding 
model of the atom was replaced with Ernest Rutherford’s nuclear model. The 
difference is that the former type of progress (e.g. collecting evidence) is progress 
because and in so far as it helps to achieve the latter type (e.g. improving atomic models). 
By contrast, the latter type of progress counts as progress regardless of whether it 
leads to some other instances of progress. To mark this distinction, I say (following 
Bird 2008, 280) that some improvements promote progress, whereas others constitute 
progress. It is the latter that accounts of scientific progress are accounts of. 
A final clarification. In the question above, I use the term ‘improvement’ 
instead of ‘progress’ to emphasize two related points about our topic. The first is that 
accounts of scientific progress are not attempts to analyze the term ‘scientific progress’ 
as it is used either in common parlance or scientific practice. Even if there was no such 
term in our languages, there would remain the question of what types of cognitive 
changes we should count as improvements on what came before. So the underlying 
philosophical question is not about language, and certainly not about the word 
‘progress’. A second reason to use ‘improvement’ rather that ‘progress’ is to 
emphasize that accounts of scientific progress are unmistakably normative – not mere 
descriptions of scientific practice or the history of science, but partly prescriptive 
claims about how science ought to proceed (cf. Niiniluoto 2019, §2.2). In evaluating 
accounts of scientific progress, we thus need to think long and hard about whether 
the normative implications of each account are, all things considered, desirable. 
Now, there are many accounts of scientific progress – many accounts, that is, 
of what type of cognitive change constitutes a scientific improvement. But four such 
accounts have been most prominent in the recent literature (see Niiniluoto 2019, 
Dellsén 2018b). The truthlikeness account holds that scientific progress consists in 
increasing the truthlikeness, i.e. the verisimilitude, of accepted theories (Popper 1963; 
Niiniluoto 1984, 2014). The functional account holds that progress consists in decreasing 
the number and/or importance of unsolved problems, by solving or eliminating 
existing problems without generating new ones (Kuhn 1970; Laudan 1977). The 
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epistemic account holds that progress consists in accumulating knowledge in science, 
i.e. in adding to the stock of scientific knowledge (Bird 2007, 2016). Finally, the noetic 
account holds that scientific progress consists in increasing understanding of natural 
phenomena (Dellsén 2016, 2018c). For each of these accounts, there is an achievement 
that lies at its heart (respectively: truthlikeness, problem-solving, knowledge, 
understanding). It is possible, of course, to develop each of these accounts in different 
ways depending on precisely how one defines each type of achievement. 
In this paper, I will focus on a feature of the epistemic account that 
distinguishes it from most versions of the other three accounts. According to 
epistemological orthodoxy – endorsed by proponents of the epistemic account (e.g. 
Bird 2007, Park 2017) – a known proposition must have a certain kind and degree of 
normative support, called epistemic justification. Roughly, epistemic justification (or 
simply justification) is what must be added to a true belief in order for it to constitute 
knowledge.2 So, roughly speaking, the epistemic account implies that adopting or 
replacing a theory cannot count as a scientifically progressive unless the new theory 
is epistemically justified; otherwise, the new theory would fail to count as knowledge.3 
Call this the justification requirement. 
Is epistemic justification also a requirement for progress on other accounts? 
Some have argued or assumed that understanding should be taken to entail epistemic 
justification or even knowledge (e.g., Sliwa 2015, Khalifa 2017). In my view, this is a 
mistake (Hills 2016; Dellsén 2017, 2018a; see also Lawler 2016). Hence, in contrast to 
Bangu (2015), I take it that the most plausible version of an understanding-based 
account does not require justification for progress. Similarly, although proponents of 
the truthlikeness account sometimes write as if justification is essential to science as a 
whole and therefore to scientific progress (e.g., Niiniiluoto 2014, 76; 2017, 3299-3300), 
this does not follow from the official statements of their accounts. Finally, the 
functional account clearly does not require progressive theories to be epistemically 
 
2 Depending on one’s theory of justification, one may also take it to be necessary to add a special 
condition that rules out Gettier-cases. We won’t be concerned with Gettier cases below, however, so I’ll 
ignore this complication in what follows. 
3 I say ‘roughly speaking’ because a proponent of the epistemic account might argue that the new theory 
could still count as progressive if it merely implies a (previously unknown) proposition that becomes 
known. In that case, only the implied proposition needs to be epistemically justified. This maneuver 
arguably has problematic consequences for the epistemic account – for example, it implies that the 
introduction of any number of falsehoods still counts as progressive provided that a single unknown 
proposition becomes known in the process. For simplicity’s sake, however, I do not take issue with it 
in what follows. 
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justified either. Indeed, the functional account distinguishes itself from all other 
accounts in not even requiring factivity for scientific progress – neither the problems 
nor their solutions must be grounded in reality in order for the ‘solutions’ to such 
‘problems’ to count as progressive (see, e.g., Laudan 1977, 16). 
It is important to understand that accounts which do not require justification for 
progress may still find an important role for the scientific practice of making 
observations, gathering data, presenting arguments, debating the plausibility of 
theories, and accepting or rejecting theories based on whether they meet certain 
epistemic standards. By the lights of any factive account of scientific progress, e.g. the 
truthlikeness account or the noetic account, these justificatory activities, as I shall call 
them, will be integral to the progress of science – not because they are constitutive of 
progress, as per the epistemic account, but because they promote progress. Indeed, 
justificatory activities promote progress to an extent that is hard to exaggerate. In their 
absence, scientific progress would be a matter of pure guesswork, and should occur 
only in those rare instances in which we happen to chance upon a correct theory. 
Because of justificatory activities, however, science is perhaps the most successful 
enterprise in the history of humankind. 
So the point of disagreement between the epistemic account and other factive 
accounts (e.g. the noetic and truthlikeness accounts) is not about how important 
justification is to progress. Proponents of these accounts can all agree that justificatory 
activities are of the greatest importance to scientific progress. Rather, the difference 
concerns how justification is important to progress. On the noetic and truthlikeness 
accounts, its importance is instrumental: justification is an important means to making 
scientific progress. On the epistemic account, by contrast, justification is constitutive 
of progress: it’s a necessary condition for knowledge, the accumulation of which is 
identified with progress. 
What type of arguments might be provided for or against a justification 
requirement on progress? Thus far, the most prominent arguments that have in fact 
been put forward have tended to appeal to intuitions in a very direct way. In particular, 
Bird’s influential argument for favoring his epistemic account against the 
truthlikeness account is that, in certain hypothetical cases, requiring justification for 
progress “accords with the verdict of intuition”, while not doing so “conflicts with 
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what we are intuitively inclined to say” (Bird 2007, 66).4 A number of philosophers 
have contested Bird’s intuitions about these cases and/or presented cases in which, it 
is claimed, our intuitions point in the other direction (Rowbottom 2008; Dellsén 2016). 
Moreover, empirical investigations into the folk concept of progress have at best 
delivered ambiguous results (Mizrahi and Buckwalter 2014; Rowbottom 2015, 103).  
In my view, however, the most important weakness in Bird’s argument is its 
direct appeal to our intuitive inclinations as grounds for rejecting or accepting 
accounts of scientific progress. In light of the normative nature of the question of 
scientific progress, it is more appropriate to consult our reflective judgments, e.g. 
regarding whether there are robust aspects of scientific practice and methodology that 
make more or less sense on one account as opposed to another. This is the approach I 
take in the following three sections. I will argue that there are important categories of 
cases in which the justification requirement (and thus the epistemic account) delivers 
verdicts about scientific progress that are not just counterintuitive in hypothetical 
cases, but also go against truisms about scientific practice, scientific methodology, and 
the success of science. 
 
3. Progress and Turnover 
To introduce the first problem for the justification requirement on scientific progress, 
consider first a well-known argument, the pessimistic meta-induction (see, e.g., Poincaré 
1952/1905; Hesse 1976; Laudan 1981). The simplest version of this argument infers by 
enumerative induction from the empirical premise that most successful theories that 
were accepted in the past have turned out to be false, to the conclusion that currently 
accepted theories will probably turn out to be false as well. For our purposes, it is 
worth noting that if this argument were successful, it would not so much establish 
that current theories are in fact false (since they might yet be true by pure chance, for 
example); rather, it would establish that we are unjustified in believing that they are 
true. Current theories might be true, but they would not be known to be true. 
 
4 In one of Bird’s cases, we are asked to consider René Blondlot’s claim to have observed ‘N-rays’, a 
type of radiation supposedly similar to X-rays. N-rays do not exist, so Blondlot must have somehow 
hallucinated or fabricated his experimental results. It follows that Blondlot’s claims about N-rays are 
unjustified. Now suppose N-rays did exist, so that Blondlot’s claims were true by pure luck. In that 
case, says Bird, it is still intuitively wrong to say that Blondlot’s discovery constituted progress (Bird 
2007, 67). 
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 There are various convincing responses to the pessimistic meta-induction, 
both to this simple form of the argument and to more sophisticated variants (e.g., 
Roush 2010; Fahrbach 2017). However, there is a key thought behind the pessimistic 
meta-induction that remains unchallenged (and rightly so), viz. that, in principle, a 
sufficiently dismal track record regarding our past efforts to theorize about some 
phenomenon might undermine one’s justification for believing current theories. If one 
knows that scientists in some discipline have in the past consistently produced and 
accepted radically false theories about some topic, and that one’s epistemic situation 
has not changed significantly for the better since this last occurred, then surely this 
would undermine one’s justification for believing the discipline’s current theories on 
the topic. After all, the disciplines’s poor track record would serve as a kind of higher-
order evidence that the first-order evidence in favor of the theory is in fact misleading 
or insufficiently probative. The upshot is that even a theory for which scientists have 
produced plenty of (first-order) scientific evidence might fail to be justified – either at 
all, or to the extent required for knowledge. 
What implications does this have for the justification requirement on scientific 
progress? Consider a discipline whose track record thus far regarding some specific 
phenomenon is sufficiently poor. That is, the discipline has produced and accepted so 
many theories about this phenomenon that have turned out to be radically false by 
our current lights that its current theories about the phenomenon would fail to be 
epistemically justified, even in cases where the first-order evidence for its theories 
would otherwise make them justified. Thus, by virtue of its track record alone, the 
discipline would be unable at present to accumulate knowledge by adopting new 
theories about this phenomenon, for the justification for any such theory would 
immediately be undermined by the discipline’s poor track record. Given the 
justification requirement on scientific progress, the new theory would therefore 
contribute nothing to scientific progress – no  matter how much more accurate the 
new theory is, no matter how much understanding it would produce, no matter how 
many problems it would solve (and so on for other potential necessary conditions for 
scientific progress). 
This implication is more than just counterintuitive. It means that scientists who 
are seeking to maximize their contribution to scientific progress should look 
backwards to the history of their discipline before deciding whether to work on one 
phenomenon rather than another. Specifically, they should try to ascertain whether 
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their discipline’s track record would undermine justification for future theories, 
including the yet-to-be-discovered theories they themselves hope to contribute to 
their field. These scientists should avoid studying phenomena on which past 
theorizing has been radically mistaken, since there would be no hope of making 
progress on such topics according to the justification requirement. The 
methodological implication of the justification requirement in these cases is thus, to 
put it bluntly, to avoid research on topics that would require groundbreaking research 
– research that goes against all previous theories about the phenomenon in question – 
and instead to focus on researching phenomena for which our past and current 
theories are already on the right track. 
It is here that the normative nature of the concept of scientific progress comes 
to the fore. As I emphasized in the previous section, we should choose between 
different accounts of scientific progress based not on whether the theories or their 
implications accord with ‘what we are intuitively inclined to say’; rather, we should 
consider whether such accounts agree with our reflective normative judgments. In this 
respect, an account of scientific progress is no different than a theory in normative 
ethics, which should be accepted or rejected based on whether we are prepared, on 
reflection, to accept its normative implications. So what is our considered normative 
judgment about whether our account of scientific progress ought to imply that it 
would be impossible for scientists to make progress regarding phenomena on which 
the relevant discipline’s track record is sufficiently poor? Or, equivalently for our 
purposes, what is our considered judgment about whether progress-seeking scientists 
should avoid groundbreaking research of the type described above? 
In my view, scientists should not avoid this type of research, and, consequently, 
we should conceive of scientific progress in way that doesn’t require justification. On 
the contrary, it is precisely on the topics where we believe previous theories to be 
radically mistaken that we need scientists to do more research in order to replace 
previous  theories. Indeed, it is worth noting that various major science funding 
agencies, such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the European Research 
Council (ERC), have recently adopted policies that are meant to steer scientists 
towards ‘transformative’ research, which is likely to disrupt existing scientific 
paradigms, and away from ‘safe’ research that merely builds upon previous theories 
and results (see Stanford 2019). The justification requirement on scientific progress 
implies, implausibly, that these policies are likely to hinder scientific progress, 
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because the ‘transformative’ theories that scientists are being encouraged to develop 
would imply that previous theories are radically mistaken, which in turn would 
undermine, via the route sketched above, the justification for the newly developed 
theories. 
 
4. Progress and Unification 
I turn now to a second problem for the justification requirement on progress, which 
has to do with the subsumption of several previous theories under one ‘unified’ 
theory. 
The problem I have in mind is closely analogous to the so-called preface paradox 
(Makinson 1965; see also Christensen 2004). Suppose I wrote a long book containing a 
number of distinct factual claims P1,…,Pn. I have fact-checked each claim, so I’m 
justified in believing each Pi. But am I justified in believing the conjunction of these 
claims, (P1&…&Pn)? Surely not, since that amounts to being justified in believing that 
my book is completely error-free (an amazing feat, which I have absolutely no reason 
to think I am fortunate enough to have accomplished). Indeed, it seems that I would 
be justified in believing that (P1&…&Pn) is false, and that I might accordingly say or 
imply as much in the preface to my book (“the errors herein are all mine”). Several 
lessons have been drawn from this type of case. One of the least controversial such 
lesson is that justification is not closed under conjunction: one can be justified in 
believing a number of claims and yet fail to be justified in believing their conjunction 
(even when one is also justified in taking the latter to follow logically from the former). 
 This failure of justification to be closed under conjunction can be effortlessly 
explained on the assumption that justification requires some minimum of probability 
(where ‘probability’ may be given any standard interpretation, e.g. in terms of rational 
degrees of confidence). For any two propositions, P1 and P2, neither of which entails 
the other, it is a theorem of the probability axioms that the probability of (P1&P2) is 
lower than the probability of each of P1 and P2. A fortiori for longer conjunctions of 
non-entailing propositions. It follows that conjoining non-entailing propositions will, 
sooner or later, result in a conjunction whose probability is as low as you like.5 So if 
being justified in believing P requires that the probability of P exceed some threshold 
 
5 Well, almost: it will never get to 0 unless one of the conjuncts is a contradiction or contradicts the rest 
of the conjunction. 
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t > 0 (e.g. 90%), then a conjunction of justified claims may not itself be justified. In 
other words, justification would not be closed under conjunction. Indeed, it is not hard 
to see that failures of justification closure are rather commonplace on this picture, even 
for maximally short conjunctions (and a fortiori for longer conjunctions). For example, 
if we set the probability threshold for justification at t = 90%, and assume P1 and P2 to 
be probabilistically independent, then justification fails to be closed under conjunction 
even when P1 and P2 each have 94% probability. 
 So much for the preface paradox. Now consider the scientific practice of 
subsuming theories about the same phenomenon under a ‘unified’ theory that entails 
all of the subsumed theories. The example with which I will operate here concerns 
various gas laws that were proposed and accepted in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, 
relating two or more quantities of a gas: 
• Boyle’s Law, discovered in 1662, holds that for a given gas sample at a fixed 
temperature, pressure (P) is inversely proportional to volume (V): P µ 1/V.  
• Charles’s Law, discovered around 1780, holds that in a given gas sample with fixed 
pressure, volume is proportional to temperature (T): V µ T. 
• Avogadros’s Law, discovered in 1811, states that for fixed temperature and pressure, 
volume is proportional to the amount of gas molecules in the sample, measured in 
moles (n): V µ n. 
• The Ideal Gas Law, first formulated in 1834, subsumes all of these laws, and much 
else besides, under one equation: PV = nRT (where R is a the universal gas 
constant). 
Now, it is not hard to see that the Ideal Gas Law entails each of Boyle’s Law, Charles’s 
Law, and Avogadros’s Law, and that none of the latter (or indeed their conjunction) 
entails the former. Thus it is plausible that at some point in history, e.g., just after the 
Ideal Gas Law was proposed in 1834, these theories constituted a case in which 
justification fails to be closed under conjunction. After all, each of the three subsumed 
laws, i.e. Boyle’s, Charles’s, and Avogadros’s, were presumably justified at some point 
when the Ideal Gas Law failed to be so, for the simple reason that there are many more 
ways for the Ideal Gas Law to be false than for each of Boyle’s Law, Charles’s Law, 
and Avogadros’s Law to be false. Put in terms of probability, the probability of the 
Ideal Gas Law is necessarily a great deal lower than the probability of each of the three 
subsumed laws. 
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Admittedly, whether this particular case counts as one in which justification 
closure fails will depend on historical details of the case that I would not presume to 
know for certain. Was the Ideal Gas Law already justified in 1834? And were all of 
Boyle’s Law, Charles’s Law, and Avogadros’s Law definitely justified at that time? If 
the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, or if the answer to the second is ‘no’, then this 
case does not exemplify the failure of justification closure. In that case, we’d have to 
look elsewhere for an historical example to illustrate the point, or imagine a nearby 
possible world in which Boyle’s, Charles’s, and Avogadros’s were justified at some 
point when the Ideal Gas Law failed to be so. No matter. The philosophical point here 
is that we can surely find – or, failing that, imagine – some case in which previous 
theories T1,…,Tn, which are individually justified, are subsumed under a ‘unified’ 
theory TU, which fails to be justified due to its having a (much) lower probability than 
any of the previous theories T1,…,Tn. 
The problem with all of this for the justification requirement is that, in such a 
case, the step from accepting each one of the subsumed theories, T1,…,Tn, to (also) 
accepting the subsuming theory, TU, would not count as progressive – even when all 
theories involved would otherwise qualify for making progress. For example, 
according to the justification requirement, the formulation and acceptance of the Ideal 
Gas Law might very well (depending on the details mentioned above) not have been 
progressive when it was formulated in 1834, even if the discovery of each of Boyle’s 
Law, Charles’s Law, and Avogadros’s Law constituted progress. This implication is 
hard to swallow, since the discovery of the Ideal Gas Law seems paradigmatic of 
scientific progress. Indeed, it seems to be precisely because the Ideal Gas Law 
subsumes several previously accepted gas laws that it contributes so much to 
progress. More generally, the justification requirement entails, implausibly, that 
progress-seeking scientists should avoid subsuming previous theories under a unified 
theory in cases where justification is not closed under conjunction. That can’t be right. 
 
5. Progress and Disagreement 
A third and final problem with the idea that scientific progress requires epistemic 
justification concerns the relationship between progress and disagreement in science. 
 In recent epistemology, there has been much interest in peer disagreement. Two 
or more agents count as ‘peers’ in the relevant sense just in case they are (roughly) 
equally well informed with respect to a given proposition, and (roughly) equally 
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competent reasoners with regard to that proposition. A much-discussed question has 
been how (if at all) one should modify one’s beliefs upon encountering disagreement 
from someone one recognizes as one’s epistemic peer. A bewildering number of views 
on this issue have been defended, most of which entail that, in one way or another, 
the parties to a peer disagreement should ‘conciliate’, i.e. move closer to the opinion(s) 
of those with whom they disagree. The ‘should’ here is epistemic: it concerns how an 
agent would have to modify their beliefs in order to ensure that they remain 
epistemically justified after becoming aware of the disagreement. So most of the views 
on offer hold that a revealed peer disagreement undermines the relevant agents’ 
justification for their initial beliefs. 
 Although much of the discussion about peer disagreement appeals to idealized 
cases, many of the lessons from these discussions apply to real disagreements in 
science.6 Most scientists working in the same field have access to roughly the same 
evidence (because they share their results in a systematic way), and they are roughly 
equally competent in reasoning from that evidence (because they are selected based 
on similar competencies, and receive a similar type of training). So while not all 
scientists within a field will be ‘peers’ in the strictest sense of the term, there is reason 
to think that what’s true of disagreement among peers will largely be applicable to 
disagreement among scientists within the same field. And although the parties to 
scientific disagreements tend to be groups of multiple scientists as opposed to 
individual agents, this also is no obstacle to learning from the peer disagreement 
debate, at least not when the groups of scientists are of comparable sizes (as in a 
47/53% split, for example). 
 Now consider a garden-variety scientific disagreement that arises and evolves 
over time. Initially, a theory T1 is overwhelmingly accepted by the scientists working 
in the relevant field. Then, at some later time, a rival theory T2 is proposed, where T2 
is superior to T1 in whatever way is required for progress (e.g. by being more 
truthlike). Slowly but steadily, T2 wins over the proponents of T1; moreover, new 
 
6 A common complaint about the peer disagreement debate is that it deals only with a very idealized 
form of disagreement, so that little if anything can be learned from it about more realistic cases. This 
complaint is largely based on a confusion. No one is suggesting that we should simply extrapolate from 
idealized to realistic cases, as in some sort of enumerative induction from a single case. Rather, the 
point of focusing the debate on idealized cases is to home in on the factors that might be relevant to 
whether, and how, a disagreement undermines epistemic states such as justified belief. Once we have 
discovered what those factors might be in a controlled situation in which others factors have 
deliberately been eliminated, we can locate those factors in more realistic cases, where several other 
factors will be at play as well. 
 13 
generations of scientists tend to favor T2 over T1, so that T2 grows in popularity “one 
funeral at a time”. Eventually, T2 becomes overwhelmingly accepted, just as T1 had 
been previously. But this process does not happen over night; it’s gradual. So there is 
a period of time, Dt, during which proponents of T1 and T2 are of comparable sizes. 
During Dt, those on either side of the T1/T2 divide can look over to the other side and 
see that the number of fellow scientists who disagree with them is about as large as 
the number of those who agree. 
 Now consider whether proponents of either theory, T1 or T2, would be justified 
in believing their preferred theory during Dt. Without further information about the 
case, it’s impossible to give a definitive answer. But one thing that can be said 
definitively is that, according to most views of peer disagreement (i.e., any 
conciliatory view), one of the factors that is relevant to determining whether these 
beliefs are justified is that there is so much disagreement within their field. 
Specifically, their awareness of this widespread disagreement on T1/T2 would 
undermine their justification for believing whichever of T1 and T2 they in fact believe. 
In order to home in on how this affects scientific progress, let us consider a 
variation of the cases described above in which each scientist’s first-order evidence for 
which of T1 and  T2 they believe is just barely sufficient during Dt to make them 
epistemically justified (i.e. justified to the extent required for knowledge) in believing 
T1/T2. In such cases, the justification-undermining effect of the disagreement would 
prevent scientists from being epistemically justified in believing either of T1 and  T2 
during Dt. Of course, the T1/T2-disagreement’s potency to block epistemic justification 
in this way would disappear once the disagreement abates, i.e. once T2 starts to 
become significantly more popular than T1. But for some period of time when the 
disagreement is sufficiently evenly split, i.e. during Dt, the relevant scientists would 
not be epistemically justified in their beliefs about T1 and T2. 
 Now consider what this means for scientific progress if we impose a 
justification requirement. If justification is required for progress, the disagreement 
during Dt would not just prevent scientists from being justified in their beliefs 
regarding T1/T2; it would also prevent their beliefs regarding T1/T2 from contributing 
towards scientific progress in the way they otherwise would (e.g., through 
constituting accumulated knowledge). Thus whereas we might have thought that the 
gradual replacement of T1 by T2 before, during, and after Dt was simply a case in which 
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there was gradual progress as an increasing number of scientists came to accept a 
superior theory,7 the justification requirement implies that the disagreement during 
Dt blocks any of the progress with respect to T1/T2 that would otherwise occur during 
that period. Moreover, given that scientists’ beliefs regarding T1 were (barely) 
epistemically justified before Dt, the justification requirement implies that there is a 
sudden drop in progress at the beginning of Dt. It’s as if disagreement casts a 
paralysing spell that temporarily destroys previous progress on the topic and blocks 
any further progress during the period. This spell is then lifted when the disagreement 
has abated sufficiently so as to no longer undermine justification as it once did (see 
Figure 1 for a simple illustration).8 
 
Figure 1: A simple illustration of how disagreement would temporarily 
block progress according to the justification requirement. 
To see just how absurd these consequences of the justification requirement are, 
it may be helpful to apply them to an historical case. In the 18th and early 19th century, 
the dominant theory of the nature of light was Isaac Newton’s ‘corpuscular’ theory, 
according to which lights consisted of tiny particles emitted from light sources. 
Newton’s theory went mostly unchallenged until Augustin-Jean Fresnel’s 
formulation of a transverse wave theory in 1815-1818, according to which light 
consists of waves that oscillate in a direction perpendicular to its movement. Fresnel’s 
theory enjoyed considerable empirical success shortly after it was formulated. For 
example, the theory correctly predicted that a bright spot would appear at the center 
 
7 I am assuming for simplicity that T2 is superior to T1 in other respects (e.g. by being more truthlike). 
If not, e.g. if T1 is superior, then this would be a case of scientific regress, but the argument in the main 
text would apply mutatis mutandis. 
8 Note that the issue here is not the epistemic one that we wouldn’t know – or be justified in our beliefs 
about – whether we are making progress on the relevant phenomenon during Dt. Rather, the issue is 
that, according to the justification requirement, there wouldn’t be any progress on the relevant 
phenomenon during Dt. 
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of the shadow formed by shining light from a single source on an opaque disc. This 
and other convinced some scientists, especially Fresnel’s French compatriots, that his 
theory was correct in the early 1820s. At the same time, many other scientists, 
especially Newton’s British compatriots, remained skeptical of Fresnel’s theory and 
loyal to Newton’s. During the latter half of the 1820s, however, Fresnel’s theory grew 
steadily in popularity, even in Britain, and by the 1830s there were few supporters of 
Newton’s theory left on the scene. 
 For the sake of the argument, let us suppose that Fresnel’s theory is superior to 
Newton’s in whatever way is required for a replacement of the latter by the former to 
constitute scientific progress. Suppose also that, at some point in the 1820s, the 
scientific community of optical physicists was sufficiently evenly split so that none, or 
at least relatively few, of them would have been epistemically justified in believing 
either theory according to most views of peer disagreement.9 During this period, then, 
the justification requirement evidently implies that there was no, or at least little, 
scientific progress with respect to theories of light. Progress on the topic would have 
been blocked by the spell of widespread disagreement about which theory is correct. 
Once Fresnel’s theory became sufficiently popular in comparison to Newton’s – in the 
late 1820s or early 1830s, say – this lifts the spell so that scientific progress could again 
go back to normal. 
 Of course, a proponent of the justification requirement could respond by 
rejecting any view in the epistemology of disagreement on which peer disagreement 
has the capacity to undermine epistemic justification. There are two related issues 
with this response. First, it ties the plausibility of the justification requirement (and 
thus any account of scientific progress that incorporates it) very tightly to particular, 
minority views in the epistemology of disagreement. Although many views reject the 
idea that one loses all justification upon discovering that one is in a peer disagreement, 
there are much fewer views on which awareness of peer disagreement does not to any 
extent undermine one’s justification for one’s initial beliefs in a way that could prevent 
the belief from being epistemically justified in certain cases. Second, the few views 
that have been proposed on which disagreement does not undermine justification at 
 
9 Some of these scientists might have had relevant evidence that most other scientists lacked and/or 
been more competent than their average colleague, in which case they might not have been sufficiently 
close to being peers for their justification to be undermined by the disagreement. 
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all are arguably quite underdeveloped.10 Indeed, it is noteworthy that one early 
proponent of such a view (Kelly 2005), later argued for a view on which some 
conciliation is often called for in cases of peer disagreement (Kelly 2010). 
Better then, I say, to simply reject the justification requirement on scientific 
progress. Having done so, disagreement presents no obstacle to scientific progress. In 
a case where T1 gradually loses out to T2, there will come a time at which neither 
proponents of T1 nor proponents of T2 are justified in believing their preferred theory 
to be true, due to the widespread disagreement between them. While this puts 
working scientists in an epistemological conundrum regarding what to believe and 
pursue, it is no hindrance to scientific progress. If the replacement of T1 by T2 is 
otherwise progressive, e.g. in virtue of increasing truthlikeness or conveying more 
understanding, then this is simply a case of gradual scientific progress. No spell is 
cast, no progress blocked. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The justification requirement on scientific progress holds that in order for the 
adoption of a new theory to qualify as progressive, scientists must be epistemically 
justified in believing the new theory. I have argued against any such requirement by 
considering various commonplace scientific situations in which justification is 
undermined or absent. To deny that there is scientific progress in these situations is to 
condemn much of scientific practice as non-progressive. 
  
 
10 For example, Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) are often mentioned as defending a view on which 
conciliation is not called for in peer disagreements. But Hawthorne and Srinivasan do not really defend 
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